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Institute Examination in Law
By Spencer Gordon
[The following answers to the questions set by the board of examiners of the
American Institute of Accountants at the examinations of May, 1930, have
been prepared at the request of The Journal of Accountancy. These
answers have not been reviewed by the board of examiners and are in no way
official. They represent merely the personal opinions of the author.—Editor,
The Journal of Accountancy.]

Examination in Commercial Law
May 16, 1930, 9 A.M. to 12:30 P.M.
Group I
A nswer all questions in this group.

No. 1:
$5,000

No. 657
The First National Bank
Newark, N. J., Jan. 15, 1929.
E. R. Cater has deposited in this bank Five Thousand Dollars payable to the
order of himself on the surrender of this certificate properly endorsed, with
interest at 4^%J. H. Benedict, Cashier.
Is the foregoing a negotiable instrument?
use?

What is it called?

What is its

Answer:
(a) The foregoing is a negotiable instrument, because it is a written uncondi
tional promise by the bank to pay a sum certain in money, on demand, to the
order of E. R. Cater.
(b)
It is called a certificate of deposit.
(c) It serves as an acknowledgment by the bank of the receipt of a sum of
money on deposit, which in this case the bank promises to pay to the order of
the depositor, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and
the depositor is created.

No. 2:
Jones decides to purchase a tractor for use on his farm. The George Tractor
Company manufactures and markets a tractor under the trade name of “ Chal
lenge Tractors.” Jones purchases a “ Challenge” tractor but after two weeks’
use he finds that it is not of sufficient power for his work because his farm is
largely soft muck land used for raising market vegetables. He seeks to return
the tractor and the George Tractor Company seeks to recover an unpaid
balance of the purchase price. Which of them would succeed?
Answer:
The George Tractor Company would succeed in recovering the unpaid pur
chase price. The sale could be rescinded only upon the theory of breach of an
implied warranty of fitness. In the case of the sale of a specified article under
its trade name, and in the absence of a reliance on the seller to furnish an article
fit for a disclosed use, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any par
ticular purpose for which the buyer intends to use it.
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No. 3:
Jones, Johnson and Perry form a partnership. Jones contributes $5,000,
Johnson $3,000 and Perry $1,000. The partnership agreement omits any pro
vision indicating how the profits are to be divided. If the business results in
profit how will such profit be shared by the partners?
Answer:
In the absence of any agreement for division the profits of the partnership
should be shared equally. The difference in contribution of capital may be
offset by differences in services performed, and courts decline to look into the
question of which partner may have made the greatest contribution.
No. 4:
A man dies on August 15, 1929. His estate is still in process of settlement on
December 31, 1929. How is the income of the decedent and of his estate for
1929 returned for federal income-tax purposes? What personal exemption
would be allowed against the 1929 income of the decedent, his estate and his
widow?
Answer:
The income of the decedent should have been returned by his executor or
administrator on or before March 15, 1930. The income of his estate should
likewise have been returned by his executor or administrator on or before
March 15, 1930. The full personal exemption of $3,500 would be allowed
against the 1929 income of the decedent. The full exemption of $1,500 would
be allowed against the income of his estate. The full exemption of $1,500 or
$3,500 would be allowed against the income of his widow, depending upon
whether or not she was the head of a family at the close of the taxable year.

No. 5:
You become secretary of a large corporation and, among other duties, have
charge of all transfers of the corporation’s stock. To safeguard the corporation
what formalities would you require with reference to each certificate presented
for transfer?
Answer:
I would insist on having a trust company appointed registrar and another
trust company appointed transfer agent, and would turn the matter over to
them. No large corporation should have the transfer of its stock handled by
its secretary.
Group II

Answer any five of the questions in this group, but no more than five.

No. 6:
What is the distinction between insolvency laws and bankruptcy laws?
Answer:
The only distinction which now exists between insolvency laws and bank
ruptcy laws is a matter of terminology; the term “bankruptcy act ” referring to
the federal statute, and the term “insolvency statutes” referring to statutes of
the several states.
No. 7:
The M Company, a boatbuilder, selected certain mahogany lumber in the Y
Company’s yard and bought and paid for it. The Y Company agreed to load
the lumber on a railroad freight car to be placed on the siding in its yard.
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Before the Y Company had the opportunity to do so, the lumber was destroyed
by a fire which was not due to any fault of the Y Company. On whom does the
loss fall?
Answer:
The loss falls on the Y Company. The general rule is that a person having
the title to the property bears the loss. Unless a contrary intention appears,
where a contract for the sale of specific goods requires the seller to deliver such
goods at a particular place, it is presumed under the uniform sales act that the
parties do not intend that title should pass until such delivery is made. This is
true even though the property has been paid for by the buyer. In the present
case, the Y Company was required by contract to load the lumber on a freight
car. This loading would be the delivery, and title did not pass until that was
done. (In this answer I assume there is no particular significance in the word
“bought” contained in the question. If the word “bought” implies a special
contract by reason of which title passed the answer would be otherwise.)
No. 8:
Assume that in question No. 7 the Y Company had loaded the lumber on the
freight car and had consigned the car to the M Company, but before the car
was started on its journey fire had destroyed the car and its contents. Would
there be any responsibility different from that developing from the conditions
given in question 7 and, if so, why?
Answer:
On the principle stated in the preceding question, title passed from the Y
Company to the M Company when the Y Company had loaded the lumber on
the freight car. Therefore, as between the Y Company and the M Company,
the M Company must bear the loss. But since the lumber had been consigned
to the M Company, it was in the possession of the carrier, which, if it was a
common carrier, would be liable for the loss of the lumber by the fire unless the
fire was caused by an act of God or the public enemy. The fact that a railroad
company does not own or control the siding on which it has placed its cars for
the reception of freight but has furnished them to a shipper on a private switch,
does not affect the carrier’s responsibility if the essential elements of a delivery
otherwise are present.

No. 9:
Allen, by fraud, induces Bates to issue a negotiable promissory note to him.
Allen then sells the note to Cameron, who is a holder in due course. Cameron,
in turn, negotiates the note to Davis who, while not a party to the fraud, has
full knowledge of it. Can Davis recover from Bates? State the rule involved
and the reason for it.
Answer:
Davis can recover from Bates. A holder of a note who derives his title thereto
through a holder in due course thereof and who is not himself a party to any
fraud or illegality affecting the note has all the rights of the holder in due course
in respect of all parties prior to the latter. The protection of the holder in due
course against diminution of the market for the note is the reason for the rule.
No. 10:
The board of tax appeals, in a case known as “Matter of McNeil,” decided
that commissions paid to brokers by owners for consummating leases of space in
buildings are deductible in the year when paid, instead of in annual instalments
spread over the terms of the leases as previously ruled by the commissioner of
internal revenue. The commissioner announced his non-acquiescence in this
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decision. What is the significance of this action and how would you advise a
client to handle similar commissions in his income-tax return for 1929?
Answer:
The commissioner’s non-acquiescence in the board’s decision implies that he
will not follow it in other cases involving that point, and that he will probably
test the question in the courts. Pending such a final determination I should
advise my client to follow the board’s decision and deduct the commissions in
his return for 1929.
No. 11:
X, Y and Z entered into a partnership which, by the provisions of the partner
ship agreement, was to continue for a term of three years. Z, however, during
the first year disagreed many times with X and Y as to business policies, such
disagreements resulting in strained personal relations between the partners.
At the close of the first year X and Y decided to drop Z from the partnership
and so informed him. Could X and Y compel Z to withdraw?
Answer:
X and Y can not compel Z to withdraw from the firm, the partners having
agreed to continue the partnership for three years.
No. 12:
A owns 100 shares of stock of the X Steel Corporation. At a meeting of the
board of directors held in January, 1929, a dividend was declared, payable
April 1, 1929, to stockholders of record March 1, 1929. A died on March 15,
1929, leaving a will under which everything that he owned at the time of his
death was left in trust, the income thereof only to be paid to his wife during her
life. When the dividend was paid to the executors on April 1, 1929, was it
proper to treat it as part of the trust estate or as income payable to the wife?
Answer:
It was proper to treat this dividend as a part of the trust estate. A being a
stockholder of record March 1, 1929, was entitled to receive on April 1, 1929, a
dividend on his 100 shares of stock of the X Steel Corporation. This made the
X Steel Corporation the debtor of A on March 1, 1929, to the amount of the
dividend, although it was not payable until later. This debt constituted a part
of A’s estate.
No. 13:
The commissioner of internal revenue has ruled adversely to your conten
tions on certain items of an income-tax return of your client and has assessed an
additional tax. To what tribunals may the case be taken for review of the com
missioner's action?
Answer:
The case may be taken to the board of tax appeals for a redetermination of
the deficiency asserted by the commissioner. The decision of the board may
be reviewed by a circuit court of appeals or the court of appeals of the District
of Columbia, in accordance with section 1002 of the revenue act of 1926. The
decision of either of these courts may be reviewed by the supreme court of the
United States upon certiorari. If the additional tax has been paid, then the
taxpayer may after filing a claim for refund sue in a district court of the United
States or in the court of claims for its recovery. Such suit can be instituted six
months after the claim is filed or immediately after its rejection by the com
missioner. A decision of a district court may be reviewed by the circuit court
of appeals and in turn by the supreme court of the United States on certiorari.
A decision of the court of claims may be reviewed by the supreme court of the
United States upon certiorari.
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